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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 19-1249 
________________ 
 
YVONNE RALEY, 
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FELICIAN COLLEGE 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2:15-cv-06626) 
District Judge: Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2020 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 16, 2020) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Yvonne Raley appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
her former employer, Felician College, on her Title VII gender discrimination claim.  Raley 
argues the District Court erred in holding, first, that she had not established a prima facie 
case of discrimination,1 and second, that she failed to demonstrate Felician’s reason for her 
termination was pretextual.  We resolve this case on the second ground: Raley’s failure to 
demonstrate that Felician’s reason for her termination was pretextual is fatal to her case.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
I. Discussion2 
We review the grant of summary judgment here de novo and will affirm if “there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and, viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to Raley, Felician is nonetheless “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a); Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013).    
Felician asserts that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating 
Raley’s employment: a drop in student enrollment precipitated a schoolwide reduction-in-
force and Raley was selected for termination based on a holistic assessment of criteria, 
 
 1 Specifically, Raley asserts that she established her prima facie case by identifying 
at least two similarly situated comparators, Drs. Khawaja and Abaunza, who had less 
seniority and were not terminated.  Felician argues that the District Court correctly 
concluded that neither comparator was similarly situated because, unlike Raley, they both 
had administrative duties in addition to their classroom responsibilities.  In view of our 
disposition on alternative grounds, we need not resolve that dispute.  
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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including “academic prioritization; essentiality to the program; teaching effectiveness; 
service to the university; credentials; scholarship, and seniority.”  Def.’s Statement of 
Material Facts ¶¶ 35–36, ECF No. 50-21.  To defeat summary judgment, Raley must show 
that Felician’s proffered reason was pretextual by “point[ing] to evidence that would allow 
a factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s reason[s].”3  Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of 
Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 
(3d Cir. 1994)).  On appeal, Raley advances two principal arguments.  Neither is 
persuasive.  
First, she argues that two Felician administrators disputed Felician’s claim that it 
was in dire economic straits.  These administrators stated Felician’s enrollment projections 
were “trending upward” and that the financial strain Felician faced at the time of Raley’s 
termination was not “materially different” from prior dips in enrollment that the college 
weathered successfully.  See Kubersky Aff. ¶ 12, ECF No. 56-3; Back Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 
56-4.  But those same administrators testified that they either were not privy to discussions 
about Felician’s financial condition or had not reviewed the college’s financial data.  
Without any substantial ground for challenging Felician’s description of its financial state, 
these administrators’ comments do not suffice to demonstrate that Felician’s proffered 
reason for Raley’s termination was pretextual.   
 
3 Raley does not point to evidence that “an invidious discriminatory reason was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause” as an alternative way to show 
pretext.  Willis, 808 F.3d at 645 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Second, Raley points out that prior to her termination, a Felician taskforce had 
ranked her department in the top quintile of its departments, and she was teaching more 
students than any other faculty member in her department.  This evidence does not discredit 
Felician’s economic motive for Raley’s termination.  The question before us “is not whether 
the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason 
is [discrimination].”  Willis, 808 F.3d at 647 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
Considered alongside the other steps Felician took to cut its operating budget—including 
firing at least fifteen other professors, half of whom were men, and decreasing 
administrative positions schoolwide—this evidence is insufficient to support an inference 
that Felician’s reason for terminating Raley’s contract was pretextual.   
 
II. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in Felician’s favor. 
